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The World of Striving
Walter Benjamin’s ‘Notes to a Study on the Category of Justice’
Andrew Benjamin
“Methode ist Umweg. Darstellung als Umweg – das
ist denn der methodische Charakter des Traktats.” 
Walter Benjamin
“V’shaf’tu et ha’am mishpat tzedek”. [They shall
judge the people with righteous judgment.]
Sefer Devarim, 16:18
 
I. Kant: Justice in the World
1 That Walter Benjamin’s short text – ‘Notes to a Study on the Category of Justice’ – is an
engagement with Kant is clear.1 The language deployed within it, it might be argued, is
for the most part derived from Kant (though the status of that derivation is yet to be
clarified). And if philosophy, in terms of presentation, is constrained to think within its
own self-presentation in language (as language) then this short text is an already present
engagement with Kant. Interpretations by Eric Jacobson and Peter Fenves, for example,
divide in terms of their identification of the place of Kant.2 For Fenves,  at least as a
beginning,  his  sustained and systematic  engagement with this  text  seeks to locate it
within an analysis of Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue (1797). The project here, while conceding the
centrality of ‘virtue’ is slightly different. Kant endures. Nonetheless, it is another Kant,
perhaps a Kant that delimits an opening beyond Kant, which would be the point where
Kant’s own structure of thought would have slipped beyond Kant’s own hold. Precisely
because the word (or term) ‘world’ [Welt] occurs in Benjamin’s text in a way that recalls
Kant, the argument to be advanced here is that what is at stake in the encounter between
Benjamin and Kant is to be found both in how the ‘world’ is thought and then in the
differing sets of  consequences to which their respective modes of thought gives rise.
While there might be points of terminological association between Kant and Benjamin,
the relation between them emerges from the way those associations are positioned by the
radically different philosophical claims of which they are the expression.
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2 As a consequence, rather than start with the evocation of virtue as though it were an end
in itself, there is another way to begin. It goes without saying that Benjamin’s text is a
sustained  encounter  with  ‘justice’.  And  the  question  of  justice  pertains  both  to  the
presence of justice in the world and then with the nature of that presence and thus the
quality of the world that is envisaged; i.e. the complexity inherent in any evocation of the
world of justice, once the world is no longer accepted as merely given. To make the task
more exact, what has to be addressed is the following: what counts as worldliness once
the question of the world emerges from within the suspension of both empiricism and the
stubborn insistence of naturalism? Once taken together, the world and then justice as
occurring within the world, the term ‘world’ now as a concept whose force remains to be
determined,  determined  nonetheless  from  within  the  purview  of  empiricism’s
suspension,  means  that  the  project  to  be  pursued  concerns  how  the  delineation  of
worldliness is to be made more exact. An intimation of how to proceed is already clear
from Benjamin’s text. Benjamin writes that, “Justice appears not to be based upon the
good will of the subject but forms the state of the world [einen Zustand der Welt].”3 What is
staged  here  is  a  repositioning  of  the  subject/world  relation,  and  therefore  a
transformation of  how the contents  of  that  relation are themselves to be conceived.
There will be a repositioning. The subject as worldly, as having become worldly, not only
follows from this undoing of the subject’s centrality,  it  simultaneously allows for the
world’s ineliminability. (A quality that obtains beyond forms of presentation that would
have been linked to the merely posited.) More significantly, it is to start with a different
philosophical anthropology, and thus with another subject, one which posses a different
sense of worldliness. Hence there is a different demand: what is the subject and what is its
world when justice pertains not to a subject’s will but to the world itself? (Possible worlds
become  conditions  of  the  world  –  this  world  –  and  not  a  subject’s  projective  will.)
Inherent within any answer is the recognition that the subject is only ever an effect of the
world; an after-effect of the world. Posed within the question of justice as worldly, there
within its fabric as a form of interrogation, is the proposition of the always possible non-
presence of justice in the world other than as a potentiality. As a result there is an ever
present even if unstated problem at work here, which concerns how justice’s actuality is
to be understood. The contention of the overall argument to be presented here is that the
proposition pertaining to justice’s yet-to-be quality, and the subsequent issue of how to
think justice’s actualization, are at the heart of Benjamin’s text.
3 Part of the argument to be advanced in what follows concerns showing in what way a
necessary split or severance within the conception of the world is equally present within
the way justice is thought. The positing of the necessary worldliness of justice, in which
justice is a quality of this world, thus not the world to come, thus as occurring ‘not in
heaven’, demands a divide between the actuality of justice’s claims, which can be equated
with  forms  of  normativity  in  the  first  instance,  and  then,  in  the  second,  with  the
possibility of justice as that which awaits actualization.4 The move from one to the other
demands both a rethinking of worldliness and thus of justice as worldly. What needs to be
worked out is another conception of justice, which, while worldly, insofar as its force
pertains to the world, is a conception of justice that has to be thought in terms of its
sustained differentiation from normativity. The latter, that which would emerge from
such a differentiation, would be a conception of justice that attends, and thus has to be
thought  in  terms  of,  immanence.5 Moreover,  it  would  be  in  terms  of  justice  as  a
continually  immanent  possibility  that  a  critique  of  the  identification  of  justice  with
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normativity could then be developed. Immanence here can be described as having the
quality of the Kantian ‘unconditioned’. As such it would then be the unconditioned for
any  conditioned,  to  deploy  a  formulation  that  is  close  to  Kant’s  thinking  of  the
unconditioned. The force of the term ‘immanence’ can be found in the nature of its link to
the practical, and thus to worldliness. In addition, it would be its necessary separation
from the domain of actuality that allows for an opening, and thus of what will emerge as
the inscription of a spacing which can be rethought in terms of critique. Within this
specific setting actuality pertains to the necessity of actualization within which there
would have been an axiomatic identification of normativity with justice. In such a context
normativity  is  the  set  of  constraints  in  which  moral  and  legal  concerns  become
coincident with justice. It would be a sense of coincidence that was forced, and which
demanded the continuity of its being reinforced. The undoing of this coincidence involves
a reconfiguration of the way the concept of the world and the worldliness of its contents
are present. The world, as a consequence of that undoing, would come to be incorporated
into another philosophical formulation.
4 Once worldliness is taken as the point of orientation, the formulation from Benjamin’s
text with which to begin is the following:
Justice is the striving to make the world into the highest good. [Gerechtigkeit ist das
Streben, die Welt zum höchsten Gut zu machen.]6
5 Precisely because of an initial affinity that allows for an ensuing severance, the severance
of Kant and Benjamin, of the many elements that demand elaboration, a start will be
made with a term that,  while it  appears and plays a fundamental  role in Benjamin’s
formulation of justice, is also central to Kant’s wider philosophical project. A term which,
while it suggests an affinity, the affinity between Kant and Benjamin, it will be in the
breakdown of that affinity that a relation, which had yielded a fluidity of connection, and
which – in the end – will have become a relation of non-relation, is then the one that
allows  for  the  particularity  of  Benjamin’s  text,  and  thus  its  philosophical  project  to
emerge. It emerges, of course, in its differentiation from Kant. The term is ‘striving’. The
line noted above from Benjamin’s  text  has,  at  the outset,  an affiliation to a position
announced in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). The affiliation is complex. There is the
already noted possible connection and a severance. The position which allows for the
intimation of an affinity is presented by Kant in the following terms:
What belongs to duty here is only the striving to produce and promote the highest
good in the world,  the possibility of which can therefore be postulated, while our
reason finds this thinkable only on the presupposition of a supreme intelligence.7
6 What has to be noted from the start is the distinction between Benjamin’s formulation – ‘
to make the world into the highest good’ – and Kant’s, which pertains to ‘the highest good
in the world’. It will be essential to return to this distinction, and thus to these divergent
conceptions of world, in order to discern what is at stake in their difference. The question
is  clear:  how is  the  difference  between  these  two  presentations  of  the  world  to  be
thought?
7 ‘Striving’ is a term that continues to appear in Kant’s writings. In The Vienna Logic (c.
1780) “wisdom”, which is the “doctrine” of “true philosophy”, is described as that which
“must be the highest good for our striving”.8 In The Critique of Practical Reason the ‘law’ is
described as having an enjoined lived relation within which that ‘law’ is present as “the
constant  though unattainable  goal  of  (his)  striving”.9 In  the  The  Metaphysics  of  Morals
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(1797), Kant’s formulation once again brings an important division into play within which
‘striving’ forms a central component. Kant writes:
It is readily seen that friendship is only an idea (though a practically necessary one)
and unattainable in practice, although striving for friendship (as a maximum of a
good disposition toward each other) is a duty set by reason, and no ordinary duty
but an honorable one.10
8 Formally, what is fundamental here is the equation of the ‘idea’ with the ‘unattainable’.
The ‘idea’ cannot be possessed. It is immanent. And as a result it cannot be the object of a
‘having’.  (Here of course is a genuine point of affinity with Benjamin in terms of the
latter’s critique of what he identifies in the “Notes to a Study on the Category of Justice”
as the attribution of a ‘possessive character’ to the ‘good’). The question that continues to
return with Kant, however, concerns the nature of this striving and its delimitation by
the  ‘unattainable’.  In  order  to  respond,  the  point  of  departure  involves  noting  that
‘striving’ is present within the world (reciprocally, of course, the world is the place of
striving). What this means is that that the real question to be addressed concerns what
striving opens, or rather, perhaps more accurately, what it demands is a response to the
question of what delimits the specificity of the world of Kantian striving. It is essential to
stay with Kant in order that the nature of the relation between Benjamin’s reference to
striving and Kant’s own references can emerge. As will become clear what is at stake is
that to which allusion has already been made, namely two radically different ways the
‘world’ is construed. 
9 At the outset, what complicates Kant’s conception of striving is that, for Kant, ‘striving’,
as it takes place within the domain of duty, is only intelligible in relation to what he
presents  as  ‘the  presupposition of  a  supreme intelligence’.  Such a  formulation is,  of
course, similar to the one in which ‘friendship’ is present as an ‘idea’. There is a structural
similarity. However, it is essential to proceed cautiously here since what matters is not
the  presence  of  a  ‘supreme  intelligence’,  as  though  all  that  is  being  evoked  is  the
epistemological register of a deity, but of that which is present in its irreducibility to the
actual. (While this is of course the essence of a political theology, further clarification is
still  necessary.)  To invert the position presented by Kant elsewhere in the Critique of
Practical Reason, human virtue is not “a mere phantom”, hence neither the law nor the
unconditioned are objects of superstition, and, as a result, to cite Kant, “striving toward
it” cannot “be deprecated as vain affectation and delusive self-conceit”.11 Note, however,
that  virtue  even  though  it  is  not  a  ‘phantom’  is  still  not  actual.  It  is  an  insistent
potentiality rather than an assumed necessity. At every moment virtue (and duty) endure
as possibilities. The possibility of actuality is equally the possibility that there will not be
an actualization. Potentiality and im-potentiality are always coterminous in their
difference (this  form of  co-presence repeats the insight advanced by Aristotle in the
Metaphysics,  namely that  potentiality  –  as  a  generality  –  is  always  co-present  with a
corresponding im-potentiality.12 When taken together they comprise the intersection of
contingency, finitude and freedom. This intersection delimits how modes of actuality are
to be understood. In this context, it refers to the actualization of a potentiality, which
starts with the assumption of the non-necessity of actualization.
10 Given the distinction between the potential and the actual and their ensuing relation, a
relation in which the contingency of connection is central, the necessity that pertains to
virtue or duty is then the non-necessity of their actualization. It is this non-necessity that
locates and demands striving. To which it should be added that this non-necessity yields
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the space that both sanctions and envisages striving. In other words, what such a setup
sustains  is  a  spacing  at  the  center  of  the  relation that  the  potential  and the  actual
constructs; a spacing that constitutes and sustains that relation. (The argument will be
that it is a spacing whose transformed retention forms a fundamental element that allows
for the move from Kant to Benjamin.) In the Kantian context what this setup entails is, in
sum, that virtue is yet-to-be actualized, and thus it is this yet-to-be quality which occurs in
the world, in the precise sense that it is yet-to-be actualized as such, even though striving
towards it is an activity that is inherently worldly. Striving is linked therefore to the
possible becoming worldly of virtue. And it should be noted that the world figures insofar
as it is retained as the place in which virtue attains (or not) actuality.
11 There is however always a limit and thus the further delimiting of a space. The following
formulation in The Critique of the Power of Judgment provides a clear instance of that limit:
The feeling of the sublime is thus a feeling of displeasure from the inadequacy of
the imagination in  the aesthetic  estimation of  magnitude for the  estimation by
means of reason, and a pleasure that is thereby aroused at the same time from the
correspondence of this very judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest sensible
faculty  in  comparison  with  ideas  of  reason,  insofar  as  striving for  them  is
nevertheless a law for us [sofern die Bestrebung zu denselben doch für uns Gesetz ist].
That is, it is a law (of reason) for us and part of our vocation to estimate everything
great that nature contains as an object of the senses for us as small in comparison
with  ideas  of  reason;  and  whatever  arouses  the  feeling  of  this  supersensible
vocation in us [dieser übersinnlichen Bestimmung in uns] is in agreement with that law.
13 
12 To continue  the  adumbration  of  ‘striving’  as  integral  to  understanding  the  way  the
‘world’ is thought in Kant’s larger philosophical project, it should be underscored that
what occurs in the above is a description of the subject who strives to live in relation to
the ‘ideas of reason’ and who, even though the subject is let down by the ‘inadequacy of
the imagination’, nonetheless still recognizes that at the heart of that relation there is a
necessity to strive. A space appears. Striving cannot be differentiated from the law even
though that striving will, in this instance, be linked to impossibility or unattainability.
Subjects,  as  those who live in relation to the law,  strive.  Striving occasioned by the
specificity  of  the  human  orientation,  defined  by  Kant  in  terms  of  our  ‘vocation’  [
Bestimmung] is that which allows for the attempt, albeit the continual attempt, to live a
life that is lived together with the law. The relation between potentiality and actuality,
and thus the dynamic of striving,  has as a result a doubled presence,  always divided
between the potential and the actual, the necessity for a form of apartness. Again there is
the inscribed presence of what continues to be maintained as an effective spacing. The
spacing  is  effective  insofar  as  it  allows  for judgment  and  thus  the  actuality  of  the
particular.
13 While the term ‘striving’ has a life beyond Kant, since it also appears in Benjamin’s text,
at this stage it needs to be understood within the setting that Kant creates. Moreover, it is
this understanding that allows for the particularity of Kant’s own position to emerge. As
has been noted, there is a condition that defines and delimits Kant’s overall engagement
with the dynamic of striving. As has been indicated, it constitutes and depends upon a
spacing. This further condition pertains to the world. Specifically it pertains to Kant’s
conception  of  the  world.  It  is  simply  that,  even  though  striving  brings  about  a
transformation in the subject, which itself can be understood as the actualization of a
potentiality, as a result of arousing ‘the feeling of this supersensible vocation in us’, that
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transformation is itself orientated by the promotion of ‘the highest good in the world’. The
project or task that arises in the context of Kant’s overall argumentation does not pertain
to the actualization of the highest good as though that end set the measure. Rather, its
necessary non-actualization allows duty to be delimited in terms of striving.  Striving
becomes a locus of possibility. The important consequence is that striving in the world
repeats the world. It is repeated as the place of striving. As such the world remains the
same.  The  world  endures  as  the  simply  given.  This  is  the  precondition  for  defining
striving in terms of actions that aim to promote ‘the highest good in the world’. The world,
as  the  place  of  striving,  endures.  It  continues  as  unchanged by  this  promotion.  The
retained reiteration of the world as the unchanging place of striving is the empiricism at
the heart of Kant’s conception of ‘world’.
 
II. Benjamin: The Just World.
14 Turning to Benjamin’s text and thus to the conception of striving within it, is not just to
turn from one text to another. More emphatically, it is to turn to another possibility for
thinking the world. The beginning of Benjamin’s texts has a specific concern. He writes:
Every good, limited by structures of time and space, has a possessive character trait
that  is  an expression of  its  ability  to pass  away.  [Jedem Gute,  als  in  der  Zeit-  und
Raumordnung  eingeschränktem,  kommt  Besitzcharakter  als  Ausdruck  seiner
Vergänglichkeit zu.]14
15 There are difficulties with this formulation that are clear from the start. What is at stake
is a form of oscillation between the ‘good’ understood as a moral term and another sense
that equates goods and thus the good with that which can be possessed (the latter in an
almost material sense, thus almost literally as goods). In regards to the latter good, as a
commodity it is articulated within a logic of needs and satisfaction, and thus a logic of
utility. Indeed, it is possible to go further and argue that Benjamin is moving between
these two different though related senses of the good (and of goods). Moreover, given this
oscillation what is then at stake is the evaluation of the moral (or the ethical) within
terms set by a sense of the good that is possessed, acquired, perhaps even bought. This
would be the good as located within the logic of utility already noted. What has to be
undone is this specific twofold sense of goods/good. Within the setup to be undone not
only is there utility, there is a necessary dependence within this position on the primacy
of a subject. One logic incorporates the other. Possession and the primacy of the subject’s
will are present as inter-articulated. An undoing of one therefore becomes the undoing of
the other.
16 A good that is a finite entity, hence one which is delimited spatially and temporally and
attributed the  quality  of  being  possessed  –  i.e.  a  good as possessable, and,  in  being
possessed, knowable, since knowing is a possessing – for Benjamin cannot ‘lead to justice’
[zur Gerechtigkeit führen].15 Benjamin’s text begins with this claim. Once any good (i.e. any
conception of the good/goods) is thought as that which can be possessed, and therefore
would be an object of a form of having, is as a result ‘always unjust’ [immer ungerecht].16
Despite the link between knowing and possessing this other good, the other possibility for
the good/goods, the one that undoes the interconnection between good and possession,
cannot be approached as if it were unknowable. It is neither ineffable nor mystical. The
significant point is that it cannot be possessed. The good to be present must be a form of
presentation. The strategy has to be changed. There needs to be another structure of
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thought. The move is clear. Once it can be argued that the good cannot be possessed then
it takes on the quality of an ‘idea’. This limit, and thus that which has to be overcome, is
the attribution to the good of what Benjamin calls ‘a possessive character’ [Besitzcharakter
].
17 The term Besitzcharakter is not generally prevalent in Benjamin’s writings. However, it
does occur in the opening of The Origin of German Tragic Drama. It figures in what might be
more generally understood as a stand against knowledge. Benjamin, in a passage that can
be located just after the celebrated identification of method with ‘digression’ [Umweg],
writes that:
If presentation is to stake its claim as the genuine methodology of the philosophical
treatise,  [Wenn Darstellung  als  eigentliche  Methode  des  philosophischen  Traktates  sich
behaupten will] then it must be the presentation of ideas [so muß sie Darstellung der
Ideen sein.]  Truth,  bodied forth in the dance of  presented ideas [der  dargestellten
Ideen],  resists being projected,  by whatever means into the realm of knowledge.
Knowledge is a having. [Erkenntnis ist ein Haben.] Its very object is determined by the
fact that it may be taken possession of – even if in a transcendental sense – in the
consciousness. The quality of possession remains. [Ihm bleibt der Besitzcharakter.] For
the  thing  possessed,  presentation  is  secondary  [Diesem  Besitztum  ist  Darstellung
sekundär]; it does not have prior existence as something presenting itself. But the
opposite holds good for truth. For knowledge method is a way [ein Weg] of acquiring
its object – even by creating it in the consciousness; for truth it is self-presentation
and is therefore immanent in it as form.17
18 The ‘good’ like the ‘idea’ must show itself. The link to Plato becomes clear. Once it can be
argued that the ‘good’ is not there to be possessed, and were that to be attempted it
would then be dissipated and lost, a different, if nonetheless still direct task is at hand. In
this regard Benjamin is precise. The ‘good’ must be able to ‘sublate’ [aufhebt] what has
been attributed to it, namely ‘its possessive character’ [seinen Besitzcharakter]. Knowledge
is displaced for the precise reason that it  is ‘a having’  [ein Haben].  What needs to be
overcome is  the  identification  of  a  good,  in  both  senses  of  the  term good,  with  an
individual need (thus the need of an individual). There is another way. What is counter-
posed to that which centers on the individual, in which ‘the good’ becomes no more than
a good, and which, furthermore, in being possessed (thus known), is then lost, contains a
specific conception of abstraction.  The formulation while complex is nonetheless still
exact. He writes:
There  is,  namely,  the  entirely  abstract  claim  of  the  subject  to  every  good  in
principle, a claim that is not based on needs but rather on justice [ein Anspruch, der
keineswegs auf Bedürfnisse, sondern auf Gerechtigkeit sich zurückführt] and whose last
inclination will not possibly concern the right to possession [ein Besitzrecht] of the
individual but a right to goods of the good [sondern auf ein Guts-Recht des Gutes geht].
18
19 Here,  once again,  is  the movement beyond the individual.  It  is  as  though there is  a
preceding right, and yet were that to be the case it would be a right that fell beyond the
hold of possession, and as such could not be defined in the terms set either by different
modalities of possession or as delimited by a subject’s will. It would become a right whose
position is similar to the setting of the idea, i.e. an enduring immanence, thus a pervading
presence. What is at work within the repositioning is the presence of right that exists on
the level  of  the idea and thus a right,  the presentation of  which becomes the issue.
Presentation cannot be thought in terms that are purely re-presentational.  Again for
Benjamin this is the prolongation of the idea. What then of its presentation? Questions
clearly proliferate. A lot more needs to be added here concerning what would amount to a
The World of Striving
Anthropology & Materialism, Special Issue | I | 2017
7
counter-measure to  a  setup  that  is  constructed  by  the  individual,  the  individual’s
possession of the good and thus, and of fundamental importance, the construction of the
good as that which can be possessed. And, if only to labour the point, it is essential to note
the inherent reciprocity between all these elements. 
20 At it most straightforward what is at work here is the move away from the individual and
thus a repositioning of the ‘good’ beyond an economy structured by possession. (The
‘good’ will re-emerge as the analysis unfolds as the ‘propertyless’ [besitzlos].)19 The full
force of attributing centrality to possession is that, to the extent that it continues, it
would have been governed by the subject. Present therefore within such a setting is a
structure of governance in which the individual is sovereign, a structure the maintenance
of  which  may  give  rise  to  violence  precisely  because  of  the  impossibility  of  a  self-
sustaining form of continuity. Governance would be constrained to maintain a form of
continuity whose prolongation would become increasingly tenuous. The inscription of
insecurity and violence occasions the entry of ‘justice’. This is not just a shift in register.
With that entry the ‘good’ occurs again. The ‘good’ now is there, not as that which is to be
possessed or ‘had’, but as that which emerges with the possible prevailing of justice. And
it should be added that it is this possibility, and, therefore, justice as a potentiality, that
underscores what is essential here. Hence, to the extent the individual is located within
an economy of possession, the world is maintained. Maintaining it however will give rise
to  repeated  acts  of  violence.  Violence  is  the  province  of  individuals  and  violence
individualizes. As Hannah Arendt argues, this is the nature of the distinction between
violence and power.20 Benjamin can be read, after the event, as alluding to such a position
when he claims that:
Justice is the power of virtue and virtue of power’. [Gerechtigkeit ist die Macht der
Tugend und die Tugend der Macht.]21
21 Power, not violence, is an essential element of justice. What is equally the case is that the
undoing of that setup, the counter-measure as effective, necessitates another world. This is
not the positioning of a utopia. That other world is one that is to be made. Following the
argument of the “The Destructive Character”,  a text published fifteen years after the
writing  of  the  short  text  on  justice,  it  is  a  world  for  which  there  cannot  be  an
accompanying image.22 The prevailing of justice however is only ever a possibility and
thus is only ever present as a potentiality to be actualized. The next lines of Benjamin’s
text make this abundantly clear. Within them, not only does Benjamin’s sense of striving
make its appearance, more importantly striving becomes a project of world making. It is
the reconfigured connection between justice and world-making that makes the former “a
new ethical category” [eine neue ethische Kategorie].23 The full formulation is the following:
Justice is the striving to turn the world into the highest good. [Gerechtigkeit ist das
Streben, die Welt zum höchsten Gut zu machen]. These thoughts lead to the supposition
that justice is  not a virtue like other virtues (humility,  neighborly love,  loyalty,
courage), but rather constitutes a new ethical category [eine neue ethische Kategorie],
one that should probably no longer be called a category of virtue but a category of
virtue in relationship to other categories. Justice appears not to be based upon the
good will of the subject but forms the state of the world. [Gerechtigkeit scheint sich
nicht auf den guten Willen des Subjekts zu beziehen, sondern macht einen Zustand der Welt
aus] … While virtue can be demanded, justice, in the end, can only be the state of
the world or the state of God. In God all virtues take the form of justice [Tugend kann
gefordert  werden,  Gerechtigkeit  letzten  Endes  nur  sein,  als  Zustand  der  Welt  oder  als
Zustand Gottes. In Gott haben alle Tugenden die Form der Gerechtigkeit]24
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22 While this passage will always have demanded a more detailed elaboration than can be
provided here, what will be noted in this instance is the claim that defines what is
essential to a political theology, namely the assertion that: ‘justice, in the end, can only be
the state of the world or the state of God.’ If there is a stand that needs to be made in
regards to the way ‘virtue’  emerges,  then it  has to be taken in relation to God.  This
position is advanced on the premise that justice is not to be defined in relation to a
subject’s will. Theology appears. God comes in the wake of the subject. Consistent with
what has already been argued, it is essential to note that the term ‘God’ no longer names
an  entity  within  any  form of  epistemology.  On  the  contrary.  What  God  names  is  a
conception of justice where the latter is imbued with power. Hence in God ‘all virtues
take the form of justice’. As a result virtue is stripped of its incorporation into a logic of
possession; a logic defined by the interplay of having, knowing and representing. It will
have finally become ‘propertyless’ [besitzlos]. The question that presses on this setup, and
it is a question that allows for an affinity with Kant, even though it is an affinity that, at
the same time, can be brought into question, concerns the possible actualization of justice
as a state of the world. The premise is of course that the state of the world is such that it
is not just. It is not that subjects do not act justly and ought so to do. The subject/world
relation within such a setting is misconstrued. Subjects are effects of a world that is not
just. Hence the critique of having and possession, while it may lead to a shift in a subject’s
orientation, is not delimited by that change. To recall what has already been suggested, it
involves  a  reconfiguration of  the  subject/world  relation,  and thus  the  emergence  of
another philosophical anthropology. Justice endures as a possibility whose actualization
is the same – structurally the same – as God’s actualization in the world. This is the
messianic  impulse.  (Its  force  shown ‘weakly’  within any one singular  just  act.)  Once
thought within the structure of a political theology, it is the refusal of religion. Religion’s
focus maintains the world, allowing only for goods to be possessed (or not) by individuals.
What is at work here is fundamentally different, namely that potentiality for the world to
be just and not to be merely the place of apparently just acts.
 
III. The World's Othering.
23 The two positions and conceptions of the world are now clear.  For Kant there is the
striving to produce what he has identified as ‘the highest good in the world’. Within such
a setting, ‘striving’ is there as that which delimits and enacts what he describes as ‘the
observance of duty’. Being dutiful is located in the worldly process of striving. To which it
has to be added that the contingency of ethical action cannot be separated from the
necessity that prompts action. What this entails is not just that the unconditioned is
effective insofar as it is itself the condition for acting; equally it is part of the world. It
endures as an immanent presence whose force is located in the necessity of its non-
actualizability.  The  counter  involves  the  introduction  of  another  conception  of  the
relationship  between  action  and  world,  and  thus  the  inflection  of  the  spacing  that
constitutes the relation between immanence and actuality in Kant. (And note that it is an
inflecting and precisely not an abandoning.) The counter-measure located in Benjamin’s
text  is  to  make  the  world  ‘the  highest  good’.  Hence  there  is  a  demand  for  the
transformation  of  the  world.  Again,  there  is  the  assumption  that  the  world  is
transformable. If there is a further reference to be made that underscores this possibility
then  it  is  to  Thesis  XI  of  Marx’s  “Theses  on  Feuerbach”.  Marx  wrote  that:  “The
The World of Striving
Anthropology & Materialism, Special Issue | I | 2017
9
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”
25 It is the last part of the thesis, ‘the point is to change it’  [es kömmt drauf an, sie zu
verändern], which is significant since what it affirms is the possibility that the world can
be other than it is. And not just that there may be other activities occurring within it,
where their occurrence perpetuates the world. The possible othering of the world is the
world as transformable.  The world loses,  therefore, the empiricist quality that it  had
within Kant’s argumentation. Nonetheless, this still assumes Kant’s starting point, namely
the presence of justice defined in terms of its yet-to-be actualized quality. The constitutive
spacing endures. It endures as the condition allowing for the unconditioned to function
as a regulative possibility. And yet what it also holds open is the possibility of the world’s
transformation. The further point is that the world’s transformability is that which allows
for the unconditioned to function as the ground of critique.
24 To move back to the question of critique, it is now possible to identify two modes. They
will  be  outlined in  lieu  of  a  more  programmatic  conclusion.  The first  conception of
critique has to assume the necessary non-actualization of any modality of a justice to
come.  Kant’s  sense  of  the  ‘unconditioned’,  Derrida’s  ‘unconditional  hospitality’,  or
‘unconditional forgiveness’, etc., provide a way of understanding what is at stake within
this conception of critique.26 Hence, in always remaining there as the to come, the to come
is absorbed into the structure of the everyday. The absorption is, however, specific. It
creates a world that holds the to come in place but refuses, at the same time, a conception
of  the world as  subject  to  its  own self-overcoming.  Here that  holds  potentiality  and
actuality apart, a spacing endures and yet it is given an ineliminable positivity.
25 The second sense of critique, while assuming the non-actualization of the unconditioned/
idea (or that which has a similar structure) as the setup that allows for critique, inscribes
a fundamental difference within it. What remains open, open as opposed to circumvented
from the start, is the possibility of the world’s transformation. Hence while critique is still
grounded – as had been suggested – in the non-actualization of the unconditioned within
which  the  possibility  of  judgment  and  critique  stands  in  a  similar  relation  to  the
unconditioned (or the ‘unconditional’), nonetheless what such states of affairs have to
leave open, or rather sustain, is a conception of the world that is no longer retained as the
same. (Again this is retention as repetition.) Here is the limit of Kant’s conception of the
world.  The  move  therefore  is  from  a  Kantian  conception  of  history,  one  which  is
articulated within the project of gradual enlightenment, to what amounts to the history
of another world.
26 Benjamin addresses the intricacy of historical time in this text in a way that is consistent
with the approach he takes to that question in subsequent texts. He writes that:
The problem of  historical  time is  already presented in the original  form of  the
historical counting of time. Years are countable but in contrast to most countable
things, cannot be numbered [nicht numerierbar].27
27 Time  is  now  that  which,  while  bearing  dates  and  thus  being  countable,  cannot  be
understood in the terms set by the simple passing of time. The truth of historical time
resists  both  calculation  and  numbering.  What  is  present,  therefore,  the  world  that
demands  this  other  conception  of  historical  time,  is  a  world  bounded  by  its  own
inscription, and thus reinscription, of the messianic, in which every moment contains the
possibility that it will be interrupted (and thus of its being other). This is a moment
constituted by a spacing, the spacing that holds potentiality and actuality apart. Now,
however, it is no longer sustained by any form of positivity. It is a setup that is pressed on
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by the possibility of an interruption that can be called the caesura of allowing: in other
words,  an  interruption  that  occasions,  and,  moreover,  an  occasioning  delimited  by
justice.28 This need not give rise to an instrumentalization of politics. On the contrary; it
is a philosophical thinking of revolution.
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NOTES
1. This  paper  was  initially  given  as  a  presentation  at  workshop  organized  by  The  Centre  for
Philosophy and Critical Thought at Goldsmiths, University of London, and the Walter Benjamin London
Research Network, held at Goldsmiths on 28th April 2016. The other participants were Julia Ng and
Massimiliano Tomba. The workshop was on Benjamin’s text, “Notes to a Study on the Category of
Justice”. The text which was initially recorded in Gershom Scholem’s Tagebücher dates from 1916.
Rather than engage with every aspect of the “Notes”, the priority in this presentation was to
establish the ways in which connections and disassociations with Kant provided a framework
within which to approach it. (Cf. Walter Benjamin, “Notes to a Study on the Category of Justice”,
trans. Eric Jacobson, in: Eric Jacobson, Metaphysics of the Profane: The Political Theology of Walter
Benjamin  and  Gershom  Scholem [New York:  Columbia  University  Press,  2003],  pp.  166-167.) All
future references are to the text as cited below.
2. In addition to Jacobson’s Metaphysics of the Profane, see: Peter Fenves, The Messianic Reduction:
Walter Benjamin and the Shape of Time (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). For an approach
to Benjamin’s text that emphasizes its link to Judaism as far more significant than Kant, see: C. H.
T. Lesch, “Against Politics: Walter Benjamin on Justice, Judaism, and the Possibility of Ethics”, in:
American Political Science Review, 108, no. 1 (2014), pp. 218-232.
3. Benjamin, “Notes to a Study on the Category of Justice”, p. 166.
4. In the Hebrew Bible, specifically Sefer Devarim 30:12, the place of the world is given an initially
negative determination. The world’s worldliness takes on the designation of “not in heaven”.
What is “not in heaven” is the place of law’s actuality. That place is equally the location of the
actualization of holiness. On the formulation from Sefer Devarim,  see: Eliezer Berkovits,  Not in
Heaven: The Nature and Function of Halakha (Jersey City: Ktav Publishing, 1983). On the question of
the place of holiness see: Andrew Benjamin, “Recovering Holiness and the Place of Others: Notes
on Vayikra”, in: Parallax, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2013), pp. 36-48.
5. A great deal of argumentation would need to be added at this precise point. In sum, however,
the use of the term ‘immanence’ needs to be understood in relation to the distinction drawn by
Kant both in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) between
‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’. In the latter Kant argues that: “the reality of the intelligible
world  is  given to  us,  and  indeed  as  determined  from  a  practical  perspective,  and  this
determination,  which  for  theoretical  purposes  would  be  transcendent  (extravagant),  is  for
practical  purposes  immanent”.  (Immanuel  Kant,  “Critique  of  Practical  Reason”,  in:  Practical
Philosophy, ed./trans. Mary J. Gregor [Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1999], p. 224.)
6. Benjamin, “Notes to a Study on the Category of Justice”, p.166 [Emphasis added]
7. Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason”, p.241 [Emphasis added].
8. Immanuel  Kant,  “The  Vienna  Logic”,  in:  Lectures  on  Logic,  ed./  trans.  J.  Michael  Young
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 259 [Emphasis added].
9. Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason”, p.208 [Emphasis added].
10. Immanuel Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals”, in: Practical Philosophy, ed./trans. Mary J. Gregor
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1999), p.585. [Emphasis added].
11. Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason”, p. 263.
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12. This passage from Aristotle is central to the argument developed here. Aristotle’s claim does
not privilege incapacity. On the contrary, the argument brings to the fore the problem of how a
potentiality is actualized. In Aristotle this is a gradual process. It is precisely this possibility that
is  no  longer  available  within  modernity,  once  the  latter  is  understood  as  a  setting  whose
temporality has been naturalized such that it coincides with chronological time. The full passage
from  the  Metaphysics is  the  following:  “Incapacity  and  the  incapable  [ἡ ἀδυναμία καὶ τὸ 
ἀδύνατον] is the privation contrary to capacity [δυνάμει] in this sense; so that every ‘capacity’
has a contrary incapacity [τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσα δύναμις ἀδυναμίᾳ] for producing the same result in
respect  of  the  same  subject.”  (Aristotle,  Metaphysics:  Books  I-IX,  trans.  Hugh  Tredennick
[Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989], p. 433.)
13. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer & Eric
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 141 [Emphasis added].
14. Benjamin, “Notes to a Study on the Category of Justice”, p. 166.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid [Translation altered].
17. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: Verso, 1998)
p. 29-30. [Translation modified.]
18. Benjamin, “Notes to a Study on the Category of Justice”, p. 166.
19. Ibid.
20. See Arendt’s formulation of the distinction between power and violence. Hannah Arendt, On
Violence (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1970).
21. Benjamin, “Notes to a Study on the Category of Justice”, p. 167.
22. Cf.  Walter  Benjamin,  “The  Destructive  Character”,  in:  Selected  Writings  2.2,  1931-1934,  eds.
Howard Eiland, Michael W. Jennings & Gary Smith (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1999), pp. 541-543.
23. Benjamin, “Notes to a Study on the Category of Justice”, p. 166.
24. Ibid.
25. Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach”, in: Selected Writings, ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis :
Hackett Publishing, 1994), p. 101.
26. I  have  discussed  areas  of  possible  affinity  between  Derrida’s  formulation  of  the
‘unconditional’  and Kant’s  thinking of  the ‘unconditioned’ in my Virtue  in  Being.  (Cf.  Andrew
Benjamin, Virtue in Being: Towards an Ethics of the Unconditioned [Albany: SUNY Press, 2016.])
27. Benjamin, “Notes to a Study on the Category of Justice”, p. 167.
28. I  have developed in much greater detail  this conception of the caesura,  which, it  can be
argued,  forms a  fundamental  part  of  Walter  Benjamin’s  thinking,  in  my Working  with  Walter
Benjamin.  (Cf.  Andrew Benjamin,  Working  with  Walter  Benjamin:  Recovering  a  Political  Philosophy
[Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013.])
ABSTRACTS
There are clear affinities between the project that can be identified in Walter Benjamin’s short
text “Notes to a Study on the Category of Justice” and the philosophy of Kant. The aim of this
paper is to show that despite possible affinities there is a fundamental divide concerning how the
‘world’ is thought. Both link justice to the world and yet the world as it appears in each instance
The World of Striving
Anthropology & Materialism, Special Issue | I | 2017
13
is  radically  distinct.  It  is  in  terms of  this  distinction that  the  specific  philosophical  force  of
Benjamin's work emerges. 
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